Rhetorical Analysis Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Rhetorical Analysis - Essay Example To conduct a rhetorical analysis, the first step is the identification of the purpose or the author's intent. Questions like what occasion give rise to the need for writing and the intentions of the author are evaluated. The author may attack, defend, praise, blame or teach about a given phenomena. The next step involves the identification of the audience; this involves the identifying and classifying the audience to either primary or secondary audiences as well as identifying the author values for the audience. The third step involves identification of rhetorical strategies used to appeal the audience accept the author views. One common appeal is the aristotean appeal which groups the author's concept to either Ethos Logos or Pathos. Ethos appeals refer to the character and confidence of the writer as well as his credibility. Pathos refers to the emotional appeals, use of repetition and description while logos refer to the use of definitions, laws, statistics and comparisons to conv ince the audience. In conclusion, it is somehow difficult to conduct rhetorical analysis especially identifying the different appeals as well as the audience classification.

Breast Cancer Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Breast Cancer - Essay Example Like all the cancerous growth, early stage breast cancer also does not produce any clinical manifestations to get it noticed early. Therefore, recommended check up guidelines should be followed regularly with alertness before major clinical manifestations are observed. Early stage diagnosis of breast cancer and its treatment, may actually cure the cancer. The different treatment alternatives for breast cancer include surgery, radiation therapy, hormonal therapy, and/or chemotherapy. Proactive preventive measures of cancer are related to reducing potential causes of breast cancer. Aromatase inhibitors are used to prevent recurrence in early-stage breast cancer and are under clinical trials as prevention measures in high-risk postmenopausal women. breast. In breast cancer, normal cells grow abnormally and give rise to transformed cells which eventually spreads in the body. These evade on healthy cells, tissues and organs by depriving them of essential nutrients and space. It is the second most leading cause of cancer mortality in US. National Cancer Institute has estimated that in the US, 0.5% women will develop breast cancer by the age of 50 and it may rise to10% by the age of 80 (Paddock). In 2007, it was estimated that 178,480 new females with invasive breast cancer will be diagnosed in addition to 62,030 cases of in situ breast cancer (Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2007-2008, p.2). The breast cancer related deaths equal to 40,460 women was predicted in 2007. American Cancer Society has reported that breast cancer related deaths are declining due to increased awareness among the population. This decline could be directly attributed to more number of women undergoing screening test like mammography. This makes early diagnos is possible and early treatment leads to better clinical outcome in terms of improved survival rates. Still women between the ages of 45 and 55 are predisposed to breast cancer related

Jornal assignment Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Jornal assignment - Essay Example On the other hand, young people have their whole lives ahead of them, so they have all the more reason to vote. Another reason why young people don’t get out and vote as much is because they do not consider it a priority in their lives. Young people aged between 18 and 29 generally have other activities that keep them preoccupied, such as studying, working, or partying. For these first two activities, young people could actually improve their prospects of getting a job or receiving a scholarship to go to university simply by voting for politicians who support education and creating jobs. For the issue of partying, there is not much to do that could change young people’s attitudes because of the particular stage where they are at in their lives. Furthermore, young people may not vote because they constantly move from state to state and so are not registered to vote where they currently reside. Young people often experience great upheaval as part of their lives, and this may mean moving from state to state to try and find a suitable job. Changing over voter registration to another state may seem complicated and too time consuming, and so young people just choose not to update their details. Also, if young people are out of state, then they may not want to send in a ballot beforehand because it involves a lot of extra effort. The key to getting young people to the ballot box is by making things as simple as possible for them. The first way to encourage young people to vote is by providing education about the voting system and what their votes mean to the well-being of the country as a whole. Young people are at a stage in their lives where they are articulate, and so they can understand a reasonable argument that is presented to them in an easy to understand manner. Another way to get younger people to vote is by presenting campaigns to them through a medium that they are already comfortable with. This of course refers to social media such as Facebook

Interpreting the 1832 Reform Act Essay Example for Free

Interpreting the 1832 Reform Act Essay Summary: The Great Reform Act, a product of in tense debate, has produced an equally diverse debate among historians. One element of the controversy centres on the origins of the Act. How far was it designed to stave off a popular revolution, and how far to preserve the influence of the landed gentry or to buy off opposition by timely concessions? Or did the policy-makers not have time to formulate precise aims? The effects of the legislation are equally controversial. Did governments become more popular and more responsive to national issues? How did voting behaviour change? The answers historians have found tend to reflect the particular constituencies they have studied. Diversity rather than uniformity characterises both the motives for the Act and its historical effects. The 1832 Reform Act continues to arouse a great deal of controversy among historians. Older accounts by Trevelyan (1920), Christie (1927) and Butler (1914) treat reform as a timely concession to popular pressure and a Whig party manoeuvre designed to weaken the Tories. But since the 1960s there have been many alternative interpretations, and as we enter the new century it seems appropriate to draw together and reexamine these differing opinions about a topic which continues to fascinate teachers and students of nineteenth-century British history. Concession or cure? According to Moore (1966 and 1974), the Reform Act was not a concession but a cure, designed to revive electoral deference. Reform was meant to reorganise the electoral system, concludes Moore, so that there would be no power for the unpropertied, a clearer distinction between county and borough constituencies, an exclusion of middle-class influence from the counties, and with more seats for the counties a reinforcement of landed influence. Parry (1993, p 80) dismisses Moores idea, not least because counties continued to have large urban electorates, and Eastwood (1997) argues that rural voters were rather less pliant, and county politics more complex, than Moore appreciates. Eastwood shows that county elections were participatory events before and after 1832, and that rural elites continually had to negotiate with voters. There was no hegemonic paternalism and no simple correlation between landlord power and voting behaviour. OGorman (1984) also casts doubt on Moores assumptions about deference, and McCord (1967) has suggested that even if the government did have clear aims (which were, in his view, to remove anomalies and bring into the political nation worthy sections of the middle classes), ministers did not have the time, expertise and knowledge needed to draft legislation which would give effect to these intentions. Evans (1995, pp 93-4) points out that neither Greys ministry nor the Whig party were united on reform. Lack of information about different types of constituency and the extent of middle-class and landed influence, moreover, made it impossible to accomplish the reorganisation posited by Moore. There was no master plan, argues Evans, only general concerns about reserving political influence for property and preventing an alliance of middle-class reformers with the masses. For the most part ministers reacted to extra-parliamentary developments (on this point Evans appears to disagree with McCord, who thinks that the main features of the reform bill were settled well before popular pressure reached its height). Evans stresses that the reform crisis did not allow ministers the time (even had they the ability) to get into the minutiae of precisely who should and should not be enfranchised in particular places. Moores thesis has also been questioned by Hennock (1971) and Davis (1976), while Beales (1992) insists that redistribution of seats was far more important to the framers of the reform bill than expansion of the electorate. Mitchells interpretation of reform (1993) underlines this point. For Mitchell the reform bill was part of the old Whig struggle against the Crown. Senior Whigs believed that liberty and property were inseparable and that more influence for the propertied classes would serve as a barrier against royal tyranny. Liberty would be safe if property was properly represented and, since the rotten boroughs no longer served this function, seats had to be redistributed and borough voting rights revised. Vernon (1993) argues that the 1832 Reform Act enabled the elite narrowly to define the people as propertied men. It thereby contributed to a political closure experienced between 1832 and 1867. Vernons idea about democratic losses, however, must be balanced by the undoubted gains achieved in 1832, especially in terms of political influence for non-elite interests. Continuity or change? According to Gash (1979, pp 150-2). the general purpose behind reform was to make the old system more acceptable. The bill had enough scope to capture the public imagination while also appearing to meet a need, but it was a clumsy measure, incapable of recasting the electoral system, and its authors were always more interested in continuity than change. Ministers lacked the intention, information and experience to go farther than they did. They were working in haste to carry out a political pledge and did not profess to be logical. Milton-Smith (1972) suggests that generalisation about reform is unhelpful, since the bill was a highly flexible tool. Though it was presented by ministers as a final measure, they meant by this that it would satisfy existing demands. Whig leaders accepted that in future decades representation might have to be conceded to new interests, and Milton-Smith concludes that the reform bill should be viewed more as a concession than a cure. Other commentators, notably Bentley (1984, p 87), Parry (1993, p 99) and OGorman (1986), have stressed that reform did not greatly alter the social composition of the Commons, or make the electorate popular, or transfer power to the urban middle classes. Some historians have chosen to focus on what was achieved in 1832, rather than on what the reform bill did not do. Briggs (1979, p 253) pays modest tribute to the governments role in making it possible for an unwilling parliament to reform itself. The reform bill was a success, he adds, because it removed the danger of revolution, attached the middle classes to the constitution, and gave aristocratic government a new lease of life. Evans (1996, pp 223-9), Derry (1990, pp 195) and Phillips (1982) have examined the importance of 1832 in promoting new forms of political organisation, registration drives, party cohesion, the rise of urban and industrial influence, and a higher number of electoral contests (with persistent partisan voting). The instrumentality of reform is clear. The bill was not just a Conservative measure. It was also dynamic. In the 1830s and 1840s there were constructive social and economic policies, and the success of 1832 enabled Parliament to regain lost stature and command wider approval. This ties in with Mandlers thesis (1990, chs 1, 4) about the reassertion of an aristocratic governing style, and with Parrys idea (1993, pp 78-89) of vigorous liberal government. Parry claims that the Reform Act achieved its fundamental purpose, which was by bold means, to strengthen the power of government to locate, and respond equitably to, social tensions, unrest, and grievances, and so secure popular confidence in more active, disciplinary rule. Hence the Whigs interventionist approach of the 1830s and their eagerness to use the powers and opportunities provided by reform to transform the range and image of government behaviour. Parry may be exaggerating. He implies that Greys administration had clear goals and complete control over the process of reform, and that ministers really knew how they were doing and how to do it when, in fact, much was uncertain and unpredictable. The Reform Act was significant not only for what it did, argues Davis (1980). but for what politicians thought it did, and reform prompted a notable change of attitudes, especially among Tories who came to accept Peel as their leader. After 1832 Peel demonstrated that he was reconciled to institutional reform, and he saw clearly that the Reform Act made the influence of electors much more significant than it had formerly been. To Phillips (1980), the expansion of the electorate is a clear indication that reform was a concession, intended to appease the nation and satisfy a growing desire for inclusion in the political process. Political activity had mushroomed since the 1780s, and the reform of 1832 created a voting public corresponding reasonably well, proportionately, to that segment of the population apparently meriting inclusion among the electorate as a result of several decades of sustained political participation. Phillips presents a coherent argument, though it is easy to con fuse effects with intentions. In a detailed examination of parliamentary boroughs, Phillips (1992) has shown that the Reform Act significantly altered voting behaviour in some locations, but that the nature of change varied from place to place. Phillips argues that after 1832 voting became clearly and consistently partisan (partly an unintended consequence of voter registration). Voter turnout increased (it was already high in many places). Religious affiliation had more influence over voting choices than social class, as had been the case before 1832, and national issues rapidly came to dominate elections. Some electoral corruption continued, though it was politically irrelevant and rarely determined voting choices and election results. Another element of continuity, therefore, was the considerable freedom of choice enjoyed by voters. These findings are useful because they indicate that elections were already politicised and participatory before 1832, and that the Reform Act furthered political commitment in a manner that would not otherwise have been possible. Indeed, reform made previous changes irreversible. Yet Phillips probably claims too much. His focus on local conditions is not easy to marry with his view that the Reform Act facilitated the rise of national parties and national issues. Furthermore, reform gave government broader responsibilities, another reason why purely local contexts were superseded. Phillips identifies an increase in voting on national party lines, but he also states that reform had uneven results. Perhaps in his general conclusions he loses sight of this point. His sample of boroughs all survived 1832 as two-member constituencies, moreover, which makes them a questionable basis for generalisation. The Reform Act possibly had greatest impact in the new boroughs it created in 1832. On partisanship, national platforms, individual voter choice, participation and turnout in the post-1832 electoral system, the interpretation of Taylor (1997) differs greatly from that of Phillips. In Taylors account party was limited as an organisation and an idea. Consistency in voting took time to develop, as did party cohesion at local and elite levels, so that national platforms were not really significant until after 1867. Individual voter choice made little sense to contemporaries, adds Taylor. because they tended to vote as members of an interest or community, not as individuals. On this matter Taylor gives a salutary warning about the dangers of pollbook analysis, which tends to privilege the views of individual voters. He argues that the reformed system was meant to represent interests; this was the constitutional context within which elections took place. As for participation, demographic change led to a relative fall in the proportion of voters among the adult male population after 1832, and in some boroughs voter turnout declined. Many potential à ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½10 householders never registered, and a large number of electors voted only once (particularly as first-time voters). The fact that there were six general elections within just 11 years (1830 to 1841) affected both registration and the inclination to vote. Much of this is incontestable, though the value of Taylors conclusions (like those of Phillips) must be balanced by a recognition of the diversity of borough constituencies. Did popular pressure really matter? Opinions differ as to the importance of popular pressure during the reform struggle. Though Briggs thinks that the bill relieved the danger of revolution, Rude (1967) notes the absence of a genuine revolutionary threat. Some historians deny that extra-parliamentary agitation did much to shape the struggle or its outcome. Clark (1985. p 402) insists that the timing and nature of reform owed most not to unrest and radicalism out of doors, but to party confusion, a conflict of opinion in cabinet and Parliament, and instability in high politics caused by Catholic emancipation in 1829. Clark blames Peel for betraying the old regime, the confessional state with its exclusive Anglican constitution, and asserts that parliamentary reform would not have been possible without Catholic emancipation. The constitution was already fractured by earlier surrenders, argues Clark, even before Greys ministry took office. Hole (1989, ch. 16) offers a different analysis. He contends that secular arguments had been replacing religious ones in political controversy since the I 790s. Therefore Clarks confessional state no longer existed in the late 1820s. Theological influences played no important role in the struggles over Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. Discussion was carried on primarily in political and social terms. Reform is not to be understood only in the intellectual and high political framework recreated by Clark. Any explanation of the reform struggle would be incomplete without some reference to popular pressure, and as excitement reached new peaks there were times when extra-parliamentary agitation had decisive impact: October 1831 when the Lords rejected the reform bill, for example, and May 1832 when the Grey ministry resigned. After the Days of May, indeed, reformers were sure that their activities had prevented Wellington from forming a government and promoted Greys return to the premiership. On the other hand, as Evans suggests (1995, pp 92-3), even in May 1832 when agitation was of more moment than Wellingtons efforts to form an administration, it is not clear that the unrest actually altered the course of events. Nor, in fact, did politicians ever lose the initiative. Wellingtons failure and Greys recall resulted directly from decisions made by William IV and prominent Tories. Brock (1973, pp 305-9) accepts that there was peril in 1832, though he points out that ministerial responses must be treated cautiously. Francis Place, Joseph Parkes and other reform spokesmen kept ministers informed of the agitation, but we cannot be sure how much ministers believed or how far they were unnerved by what they were told. Cannon (1973, pp 238-40) concludes that pressure from below was less important than decisions taken at the top. But could the unrest of this period really be ignored? Grey and his colleagues were conscious of enormous pressure from external sources, which is one of the reasons why they only returned to office after securing the Kings agreement to a creation of peers. Stevenson (1992, p 296) doubts that there could have been a rising had Wellington taken office in May 1832, for though the people had arms, they did not have the necessary leadership and organisation. This emphasises the threat posed to the established order not by the masses but by respectable radicalism and its methods. Newbould (1990, p 10) suggests that ministers were concerned less about an imminent popular revolt than about a future challenge from the wealthy, assertive and politically aware middle classes. Much was said about a resort to physical force, not least by Place in London and the leaders of the Birmingham Political Union, but this talk was meant to disturb elite politicians. The will and planning for an uprising were exaggerated for effect. Several historians have emphasised this in their explanations of reform; Thompson (1980, pp 887-903), Hamburger (1963, cii. 4), Thomis and Holt (1977, ch. 4) and Wright (1988, pp 89-95) conclude that the threat of revolution was n ever as serious as contemporaries believed or claimed. United action was precluded by divisions within the reform movement. The campaign in many towns was fragmented, and Birmingham was unusual because of the co-operation there between reformers of different social ranks. It cannot be assumed that Place, Parkes and other spokesmen were firmly in control of the masses (and there was still an insurrectionary minority on the fringes of British radicalism, though it lacked wide support). Another important point is that there was less violence in May 1832 than in October 1831. Contemporaries noted this, and some feared a sinister plot, assuming that radicals were so well-disciplined they could hold themselves back in readiness for a popular outbreak at some later time. Place allowed this idea to spread. Again, perception mattered more than reality. Place advised his allies not to hold meetings in case these revealed that the popular movement was more divided than was generally supposed. Whig MPs and peers made much of the danger of unrest when addressing Parliament, as did Grey and the King in their correspondence. Though some feigned alarm only to persuade opponents of reform to give way, others genuinely feared revolution. The fear was expressed often enough, and not only in public arenas. Private letters and records include such expressions, and perhaps these reveal what people were really thinking at the time. For Grey and his colleagues, and for the King, one of the most disturbing aspects of the reform struggle was the manner in which popular pressure became focused with the rise of political unions. The fact that these bodies had such authority, and yet for so long were answerable only to themselves, was a new and alarming development. Grey repeatedly emphasised that the only way to take the wind from their sails was to carry the reform bill, and Lopatin (1991) and Ferguson (1960) have argued that there would have been no reform without them. Words and concepts to note: Hegemonic paternalism: a form of control by the natural leaders of society; those who owned the land, that amounted to domination. Instrumentality: purpose served. Pollbooks: the records kept by returning officers of those who voted in particular constituencies.

Product Failure (Malaysia) Essay Example for Free

Product Failure (Malaysia) Essay Product Failure Failure refers to the state or condition of not meeting a desirable or intended objective, and may be viewed as the opposite of success. Product failure ranges from failure to sell the product to fracture of the product, in the worst cases leading to personal injury, the province of forensic engineering. The criteria for failure are heavily dependent on context of use, and may be relative to a particular observer or belief system. A situation considered to be a failure by one might be considered a success by another, particularly in cases of direct competition or a zero-sum game. Similarly, the degree of success or failure in a situation may be differently viewed by distinct observers or participants, such that a situation that one considers to be a failure, another might consider to be a success, a qualified success or a neutral situation. It may also be difficult or impossible to ascertain whether a situation meets criteria for failure or success due to ambiguous or ill-defined definition of those criteria. Finding useful and effective criteria, or heuristics, to judge the success or failure of a situation may itself be a significant task. Failure can be differentially perceived from the viewpoints of the evaluators. A person who is only interested in the final outcome of an activity would consider it to be an Outcome Failure if the core issue has not been resolved or a core need is not met. A failure can also be a process failure whereby although the activity is completed successfully, a person may still feel dissatisfied if the underlying process is perceived to be below expected standard or benchmark. Failure to carry out a task Failure to perceive Failure to anticipate Fail product in local market In Malaysia, there is a lot of product failure and it just too numerous to say it one by one, most of them, it did not even catch the public attention, basically, the public don’t even know the existence of the particular product. There is so much factors that can leads to product failure. Failure causes are defects in design, process, quality, or part application, which are the underlying cause of the failure or which initiate a process which eads to failure. Rather than the simple description of symptoms that many product users or process participants might use, the term failure cause refers to a rather complete description, including the pre-conditions under which failure occurs, how the thing was being used, proximate and ultimate/final causes (if known), and any subsidiary or resulting failures that result. The term is part of the engineering lexicon, especially of engineers working to test and debug p roducts or processes. Carefully observing and describing failure conditions, identifying whether failures are reproducible or transient, and hypothesizing what combination of conditions and sequence of events led to failure is part of the process of fixing design flaws or improving future iterations. The term may be applied to mechanical systems failure. One of the product/brand that fail in Malaysia is: M . Mobile or simply known as M. Mobile is an RD and mobile communication design company based in Malaysia. M. Mobile is Malaysias first cell phone manufacturer and is also the worlds first Muslim-owned mobile phone RD and marketing company in a partnership between Malaysia and China. This company is currently in operation under its parent company, Kosmo Technology Industrial Berhad Type: Berhad Founded: 2005 Headquarters: Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia Key people: Norhamzah Nordin,Chairman Industry: Telecommunications Products: Mobile phones Website: M. Mobile M. mobile’s products: Factors that leads to this brand failure The reason why this brand failed in malaysia market because: M. mobile cannot give a better satisfaction to the consumer compare to their competitor that are well established in mobile technology sector such as Nokia, Sony Ericsson , Samsung etc. Promotion (marketing) M. mobile cannot compete with their competitors in term of : Price Features Quality After sales service Promotion M. mobile should have promote their product and brand more aggressively since they enter a market where most of them already loyal to a particular brand, M. obile did not market their product as well as their brand effectively, therefore they able to capture only few attention from the public, most Malaysian don’t even know the existence of the brand. Price Price offered by M. mobile considered less expensive, but somehow, consumer nowadays always think, â€Å"even though it’s not very expensive, but it’s still money, does it worth the money? † instead of taking a risk of buying t he product which they don’t really know the background of the company, consumer prefer to spend their money on trusted brand for the same price or a bit more. Left picture is NOKIA 2690 and on the right picture is M. obile M10, both phone has a pretty similar specification and the price is almost the same(RM300+), most consumer will go for NOKIA because they want to avoid risk from buying unestablishrd brand. Features Most M. mobile product is a low end product and it does not offer variety of features compare to their competitors. As we know, consumer nowadays demand for the latest technology, therefore as a mobile phone manufacturer, knowing the consumer needs and want is the main priority in coming up with a new product, most of the product produced by this company does not reach consumer expectation who demand for better technology. Quality The quality of the product produced by this company proven not to be as good as the other brand’s products, the materials they use to make the product is low in quality, from the mainboard(interior) to the exterior of the phone. After sales service After sales service is the service provided by the company to the customer of their product, M. mobile does not offer a good after sales service compared to another company like nokia and sony ericsson. It shows that the company do not really think about building a long and strong relationship with the consumer. How the product could be successful In order for this brand to be successful, there are so many things that the company have to take into account, its not easy becoming a great company in consumer eyes, there are several things that the company have to take into consideration especially the strength of the competitors, in order to be successful, a company need to have an advantage that can overcome the competitor’s strength. This is the reason why RD very important in coming up with new product. The 1st thing M. obile have to focus on is their promotion, promotion plays an important part in creating a good image in consumer mind, since there’s a lot of well established company in mobile phone sector, M. mobile have to make a huge action in promoting their brand and product. Doing aggressive marketing by keep on promoting the product and brand is the best way to create a good image in consumer mind, of course it will cost a lot, but the return is way better. Psychologica lly, It’s a human nature, the more we hear n see it, the more we favor it, thus it will create the sense of security towards the product or brand. Price, features and quality are related to each other, this is one of the most important things a company need to think about, they need to know what type of product they want to come out with in term of the product’s quality level and the variety of it features, therefore they can set the price for the product, The company have to make sure the price is reasonable with the quality and the features of the product or else consumer will favor the competitors, M. obile comes out with one new product called M10 and the price for the product is around rm300+,Nokia as well comes out with a new product which is nokia 2690 and the price is almost the same with M. mobile m10, both model provide almost the same features, but in term of quality, we know nokia is better, consumer will think, why choose m. mobile instead of nokia? M. mobile have to make sure their offer can overcome their competitors offer, therefore consumer will find the advantage of choosing M. mobile’s products. May be it will take some time for M. obile to keep pace with the other established company in term of product quality and technology, but by putting a correct price, the company can attract more market and the company will grow. A company have to know how important word of mouth and how dramatic change it can do with the influence of word of mouth, satisfied customer will tell the others how good the product is, dissatisfied customer will spread the bad things about the product, do not give a high expectation to the consumer because the possibility of getting dissatisfied customer is high. After sales service is one of the thing people nowadays always talk about, M. mobile have to make sure they can deliver a good after sales service so that their customer will spread a good deal with the others. It is important for M. mobile building a strong and long relationship with the customer because it can create brand loyalty, once customer loyal to the product, they will keep on purchasing the product and influence other people into buying the same product. Good after sales service shows that the company really care about their customer and customer loves it when the company cares about their rights.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism What choice for Europe? Reflections on agency and structure in Liberal Intergovernmentalism ABSTRACT This article examines how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in Liberal Intergovernmentalism, a prevailing theory of European integration. It demonstrates that, contrary to the widespread view that it is agency-centred, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is in fact a highly structuralist theory in the issue areas it claims to explain best. In these areas integration is ultimately explained in terms of developments in economic structures, leaving no room for agency and ideas. The article also shows that, despite the importance it ascribes to changes in economic structures, Liberal Intergovernmentalism fails to theorise their possible causes. Keywords: Liberal Intergovernmentalism; Moravcsik; Agency; Structure; Integration theory Over the past two decades Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) has established itself as one of the prevailing theories of European integration. Elegantly combining a liberal theory of preference formation with an intergovernmentalist theory of interstate bargains and a functional theory of institutional choice it explains European integration as the outcome of a series of intergovernmental negotiations. More than any other contemporary theory of integration LI and its application in empirical analyses has provoked discussion in the field of EU studies. Opinions are divided between those who admire LI for its parsimony and predictive power and those who feel that its account of regional integration misses out on too much of importance. Either way, hardly anyone would dispute that it continues to be a theory that it is necessary to relate to in one way or another in theoretically informed work on European integration. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of integration from a meta-theoretical perspective. More precisely, it will be systematically analysed how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in LI. Any theorys account of the social world, or delimited parts of it, is based on a particular, albeit often implicit, conceptualisation of the agency-structure relationship and whether or not this conceptualisation is convincing impacts greatly on the quality of the theorys account of social phenomena and change. There is thus much to be learned about a theory, in this case LI, from examining its underlying assumptions with respect to agency and structure. This is even more so because appearances can be deceiving: as it will be argued in this article, LI which appears and is widely assumed to offer an agency-centred account of European integration, turns out to do the opposite on closer scrutiny. In addition to this introduction and a conclusion the article is divided into seven sections. The first two sections set the stage for later analyses by briefly introducing LI and the question of the agency-structure relationship, while also accounting for their respective significance. The following three sections examine how the agency-structure question is dealt with at each of the three stages of LI: preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. Against this background section six critically examines the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration before section seven discusses the political implications of LI. 1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was first presented in the early 1990s and later elaborated and applied in a string of publications of which the monumental book The Choice for Europe (1998) contains the most detailed exposition and test of the theory. LI is presented as a framework for synthesising theories into a coherent account of regional integration. The latter is explained as the result of ‘a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains (Moravcsik, 1993: 473). More precisely integration is seen as the outcome of a three-stage process where: (1) national interests or goals arise in the context of domestic politics; (2) governments bargain with each other to further their national interest; and (3) governments make an institutional choice to secure credible commitment once a substantive agreement has been reached. LI quickly became a focal point in debates on how to theorise European integration and it has subsequently kept this position. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 67), LI ‘has acquired the status of a â€Å"baseline theory† in the study of regional integration: an essential first cut explanation against which other theories are often compared. In their view, ‘it has achieved this dominant status due to its theoretical soundness, empirical power, and utility as a foundation for synthesis with other explanations (2009: 67). To be sure, not everyone would agree with this latter sentiment. As alluded to in the introduction, several scholars have criticised the theory for painting a too incomplete or even misleading picture of the European integration process and the ‘empirical power of the resulting analyses has often been questioned (e.g. Diez, 1999; Smith, 2000; Wincott, 1995; see also Cini, 2007: 112-14 for an overview of some critiques of LI). In asmuch as relatively few scholars besides Moravcsik appear to wholeheartedly embrace LI (Pollack, 2001; however, cf. Laursen, 2002), it is probably fair to say that it has acquired its status as a â€Å"baseline theory† as much because of its perceived weaknesses as because of its strengths. Similar to Waltzs (1979) neorealism LI is a parsimonious and bold theory that lends itself to accusations of neglecting or underestimating the significance of important parameters in the case of LI for instance transnational business groups and activist supranational institutions. Indeed, LI does this deliberately, seeking ‘to simplify EU politics, stressing the essential and excluding certain secondary activities (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68). Hereby it follows the neo-positivist recipe for theory construction, according to which theories should take the form of simplified models that can support efforts to make generalisations by singling out as few variables as possible and account for the causal relations between, and the relative weight of, these variables. Falsifiable hypothesises are derived from such theories and subsequently tested against reliable empirical data. On the basis of such tests, theories can then be further refined or occasionally discarded. (1 ) Testing LI is precisely what Moravcsik sets out to do in The Choice for Europe. Here standardised hypotheses derived from LI and competing (albeit for the most part artificial) theories are tested against an overwhelming amount of empirical data in five cases studies. Needless to say, LI comes out on top as the theory with the by far greatest explanatory power. More generally, The Choice for Europe constitutes an example par excellence of research informed by neo-positivist methods and standards. In its early pages Moravcsik informs his readership that the book ‘eschews ad hoc explanation and seeks instead to discover what is generalizable about EC history (1998: 2) and that it ‘is based on methods which, while far from ideal, generate more rigorous, transparent, objective, and reliable tests of competing theoretical claims about European integration than have heretofore been conducted (1998: 10). The bulk of studies of EC decision-making are criticised for biased data se lection and for relying on ‘citations to secondary sources themselves drawn from journalistic commentary or still other secondary sources (1998: 10). In contrast to this, Moravcsik claims to have backed ‘potentially controversial attribution of motive or strategy †¦ by â€Å"hard† primary sources (direct evidence of decision-making) rather than â€Å"soft† or secondary sources (1998: 10, see also pp. 80-84). (2) 2. Agency and structure The question of how to conceptualise the relationship between agency and structure is arguably one of the most important questions facing social scientists (Archer, 1995: 65). This is due to the importance of agency and structures in the social world and to the fact that it is impossible to offer explanations of events in the social world without appealing to some understanding of their relationship. As mentioned in the introduction there is thus much to be learned about the nature and quality of substantive theories from examining their underlying assumptions with respect to this relationship. Yet the way the latter is dealt with is also important for political reasons, to which we will come back in section 7 below. â€Å"Agency† denotes the ability of agents, whether individuals or groups, to act upon situations and it ‘implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy that the actor could have behaved differently (Hay, 2002: 94). Agency should thus not be confused wit h concepts like â€Å"individuals†, â€Å"actors† or â€Å"agents†: without anticipating the conclusions of this article too much, a theory can refer to plenty of agents, while not allowing for any agency. â€Å"Structure†, on the other hand, refers to the relational context within which agents operate. Structures define the range of options available to agents. Nowadays the vast majority of scholars agree that both agency and structure matter: phenomena and developments in the social world issue not from either one or the other but are a product of both. If this is the case then it is necessary to break with the two ways of conceptualising the relation between agency and structure that have traditionally been dominant within social theory, namely structuralism and individualism. In their pure versions these positions either picture agents as marionettes (structuralism) or as omnipotent puppet-masters (individualism) (Archer, 1995; XXXXX). However, knowing that both agency and structure matter does not in itself take us far. To make a difference the insight needs to be incorporated into substantive theories and this is by no means an easy task. This contributes to explain why many theories end up offering reductionist explanations of the specific social phenomena they are meant to render intelligible. In the discipline of International Relations (IR) a debate over the â€Å"agent-structure problem† was initiated in the late 1980s by scholars such as Wendt (1987) and Hollis and Smith (1990). Later, and certainly no less interesting contributions to this debate included Doty (1997), Bieler and Morton (2001) and Wight (2006). The debate has done much to clarify and in many cases criticise the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying mainstream IR theories, particularly Waltzian neorealism (Waltz, 1979). In EU Studies a similar debate has not taken place, and although in particular some constructivist scholars, have taken an interest in the agency-structure relationship (e.g. Wind, 2001), a comprehensive study of the way the most important theories of European integration and governance deal with it has yet to be published. However, it seems to be a widespread view among EU scholars that many of these theories privilege agency over structure. For instance, Risse ( 2004: 161) writes that the ‘prevailing theories of European integration whether neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or â€Å"multi-level governance† are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centred by definition. In a similar vein, other scholars have noticed ‘the ahistorical and structure-blind assumptions underlying intergovernmentalism (Hix, 1994: 9) and observed that in LI ‘agents are, implicitly or explicitly, considered primary actors ultimately determine the shape of overall structures (Christiansen, 1998: 103). In the next sections, the validity of this widespread view will be examined through an analysis of the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at each of the three stages in LI. 3. National preference formation The first stage in explaining the outcome of intergovernmental bargains is to account for the national preferences, which are defined as ‘an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes †¦ that might result from international political interaction (Moravcsik, 1998: 24). This is done by means of a liberal political economy theory of preference formation, according to which national preferences arise in the context of domestic politics, where national government leaders form them on the basis of the preferences and actions of the most important societal groups. Most important among these are domestic producers: ‘The systematic political bias in favor of existing producer groups and against those, notably consumers, taxpayers, third-country producers, and also potential future producers, stems from the formers more intense, certain, and institutionally represented and organized interests (1998: 36). The state is conceptualised as ‘a rep resentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by societal groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). Because governments have an interest in remaining in office, they need the support from coalitions of domestic actors. The policies pursued by governments are ‘therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups †¦ who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue politics consistent with their preferences (ibid: 518). In other words, ‘[g]roups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them and it is through this process that ‘the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations emerges (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). To evaluate the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at this stage in LI it is clearly crucial to understand the origins of the preferences of societal groups. Some of the early critics of LI suggested that the theory fails to account adequately for this. For instance, it was pointed out that ‘the origins of such interests are exogenized (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 56) while others claimed that in LI ‘interests are not structurally derived (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 44) and even that they ‘emerge mysteriously (McSweeney, 1998: 101). Had it in fact been the case that LI leaves completely open the question of where the preferences of societal groups come from it would have allowed for an agency-centred perspective on preference formation. That is, preferences could have been formed on the basis of all sorts of ideas and individual inclinations. However, this would have seriously undermined the parsimony and explanatory power of the theory and hence it was in fact never left open where preferences come from. As Moravcsik has made clear, LI perceives preferences to be directly caused by structural circumstances, more precisely economic structures: ‘I employ a structural theory of those preferences. My structural approach†¦employs trade flows, competitiveness, inflation rates, and other data to predict what the economic preferences of societal actors and therefore governments should be (Moravcsik, 1999b: 377). In other words, economic preferences are derived from economic structures: societal groups organise and articulate their preferences ‘on the basis of calculations of net expected costs and benefits resulting from the introduction of new policies (Moravcsik, 1993: 489). It follows as a logical implication that ‘shifts in preferences should follow the onset and precede the resolution of shifts or trends in economic circumstances (Moravcsik, 1998: 50). The assumption that economic structures translate directly into specific preferences is made possible by the rationality assumption underpinning LI. The widespread view that LI is agency-centred is related to this assumption that individuals, groups, governments and even states are rational. This begs the question of what â€Å"rationalism† precisely entails, especially as some scholars have suggested that Moravcsik fails to spell this clearly out (Christiansen et al., 2001: 4). In a recent piece Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 68) put it as follows: ‘Rationalism is an individualist or agency assumption. Actors calculate the alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future. Despite the qualifications at the end of the quote it is clear that whatever this uncertainty pertains to it is not to the consequences of the actions of agents: agents are assumed to be very well-informed about these because, as Moravcsik has put it himself, in ‘a world in which the future consequences of actions are unknown †¦ LI would make little sense (1995: 626). This is an important manifestation, because the more it is assumed that agents know the future consequences of their actions, the more it must also be assumed that they are fully informed about the context in which they currently find themselves. It is quite simply logically inconceivable that an agent can somehow know the future consequences of his or her actions without having perfect or very close to perfect information at hand at the moment of the action itself. Moravcsik is thus significantly underplaying the strength of his rationality assumption when stating that ‘it takes no position on whether states are fully informed, though a framework in which states are assumed to be informed generally performs well (1998: 23). Why not walk the plank? Surely states and other agents can safely be assumed to be blessed full information if it has already been established that no or very few unintended consequences will follow from their actions? At the end of the day the rationality assumption boils down to the view that agents are utility-maximisers with clearly ordered preferences who are (almost?) fully informed, also about the future consequences of actions. However, it should not be concluded from this that LI is an agency-centred theory as the conventional wisdom has it. As we have seen above, preferences are derived from economic structures not just in the weak sense that structures are important in relation to preferences but in the strong sense that they alone dictate preferences (albeit with a minor qualification to which we will return in a moment). Because the rational agents are assumed to be so well-informed their actions become predictable once their structural environment has been mapped. Indeed, only structures matter here inasmuch as ‘[p]references are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors (Moravcsik, 1997: 519, see also 1998: 24-25). Moreover, ideas are for the most part not allowed to play any role in relation to preference formation. It is worth dwelling on this for a moment. On one hand, Moravcsik does not hesitate to acknowledge the importance of ideas, as when he proclaims that they ‘are like oxygen or language; it is essentially impossible for humans to function without them (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). On the other hand, ideas do not play a very prominent role in LI, which is also recognized by Moravcsik when he writes that ‘[i]n the LI account of integration, ideas are present but not causally central. They may be irrelevant or random, or, more likely, they are â€Å"transmission belts† for interests (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). The only reason why Moravcsik can correctly maintain that in LI ‘[s]ome national preferences are grounded in ideas (1998: 23) is because some importance is ascribed to the latter in issue areas where the material consequences of policy initiatives are more or less impossible to calculate. For instance, he mentions ‘questions of European institutions and common foreign policy as issues where governments/states will generally not to be under strong pressure from societal groups to pursue particular policies, which creates some room for government leaders to act on the basis of ‘ideologies and personal commitments (Moravcsik, 1993: 494; see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 85). According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 76), ‘LI best explains policy-making in issue areas where social preferences are relatively certain and well defined. In the core areas, like trade, agriculture and monetary policy, ideas are not assumed to influence preference formation at all. When it comes to ‘insignificant, exceptional and speculative issues like those mentioned above or the Open Method of Coordination (ibid.: 85) where the preferences of societal groups are less clear and strong, and where the explanatory power of LI is thus recognised to be limited, ideas are conveniently allowed to play a role. To recapitulate, in LI no importance is ascribed to ideas in the explanation of what is (correctly) considered to be the ‘substantively important issues (ibid.: 85) in the European integration process: here economic structures do the job alone. (3) 4. International bargains Once the national preferences have been formulated, national decision-makers bring them to the intergovernmental bargaining table. At this second stage LI applies an intergovernmentalist bargaining theory in order to explain the outcome of negotiations. As the primary interest of the governments is to remain in office, they have a clear incentive to defend the national interest in the negotiation. Accordingly, ‘[t]he configuration of domestically determined national preferences defines a â€Å"bargaining space† of potentially viable agreements (Moravcsik, 1993: 496-497). The outcome of a concrete negotiation, however, not only reflects the different national preferences but also the relative bargaining power of different states. Moravcsik defines power in terms of asymmetric interdependence: ‘Bargaining leverage stems most fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity of national preferences, which reflect †¦ the relative costs of agreements to remo ve negative externalities (ibid.: 1993: 499). This means that ‘[t]he power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement (Moravcsik, 1998: 62). How, then, is the agency-structure relationship dealt with at this second stage? Or to put it differently: how much freedom does government leaders have to pursue their own preferences or ideas (agency) and how much are they constrained by their context (structure)? First, the answer to this question depends on the issue area. As mentioned, governments are severely constrained by domestic societal groups in core areas: here they can only act within a narrow â€Å"bargaining space† which limits their freedom considerably. In more marginal (non-economic) issue areas this space widens and government leaders enjoy more freedom to pursue their own agendas. Second, any particular government is constrained by the bargaining spaces of other governments. The nature of these determines the extent to which a government leader is capable of realising national interests. Finally, the outcomes of previous bargains serve as the status quo ‘with respect to which societal actors and gove rnments calculate preferences and alternatives to agreement (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). As mentioned above, the outcome of a concrete bargain reflects the relative bargaining power of each state. As bargaining power is defined in terms of asymmetric interdependence it is, in fact, derived from the very same structures as national preferences. These structures determine how attractive a potential policy is to societal groups and thus governments and consequently they also determine the relative bargaining power. Relative power is thus ultimately decided at the structural level not at the level of agents. This brings us back to the point that was raised in the previous section, namely that the rationality assumption underpinning LI does not serve to render it an agency-centred theory. To be sure, there are plenty of agents in LI, and there is no denying that the theory belongs to the tradition of â€Å"methodological individualism†. But by substituting real agents with ‘calculating machines who always know what they want and are never uncertain about the f uture and even their own stakes and interests (Risse, 2009: 147), LI effectively ends up with no notion of agency at all, at least not in its account of integration in core issue areas. That it is apparently unnecessary to study the interaction between state representatives in order to explain the outcome of a bargain tells it all: the creativity, charisma, persuasiveness and negotiating abilities of particular agents are insignificant in LI. By assuming that agents are identical in the sense of being rational it is possible to derive the outcome of bargains simply by looking at the context in which it takes place. This makes LI a structuralist theory also in its second stage. To be sure, the structuralism of LI differs from conventional structuralism inasmuch as the former retains a focus on agents and their free choices. But the point is that the â€Å"methodological individualism† of LI and other rational choice theories does not entail a genuine notion of agency in that a free choice is neither free nor, indeed, a real choice, if it is always already given by the context in which the agent operates (see also Hay, 2002: 103-104; Tsebelis, 1990: 40). (4) 5. Institutional choice Once governments have reached substantive agreement in a bargain, they set up institutional arrangements in order to secure it. At this third stage LI adopts a functional theory of institutional choice according to which governments pool or delegate authority in order to ‘constrain and control one another (Moravcsik, 1998: 9). Authority is â€Å"pooled† when governments for instance agree to take decisions in an issue area by means of qualified majority voting in the Council, whereas â€Å"delegation† refers to the transfer of authority to more or less autonomous supranational institutions (ibid.: 1998: 67). Pooling and delegation are ‘viewed as solutions to the problem of â€Å"incomplete contracting,† which arises when member governments share broad goals but find it too costly or technically impossible to specify all future contingencies involved in legislating or enforcing those goals (ibid.: 1998: 73). By pooling or delegating, the credibility of the commitment to the substantive agreement that has been reached is enhanced. But by giving up authority in an issue area governments clearly run the risk of being either outvoted by other governments (pooling) or of being overruled by supranational institutions (delegation) in future cases. Hence, ‘[t]he specific level of pooling or delegation reflects a reciprocal cost-benefit analysis: governments renounce unilateral options in order to assure that all governments will coordinate their behavior in particular ways (ibid.: 1998: 75). LI predicts that pooling and delegation will vary across issues and countries. Again, the preferences of societal groups are crucial: ‘Governments transfer sovereignty to commit other governments to accept policies favored by key domestic constituencies (ibid.: 1998: 76). As accounted for above the preferences of societal groups are seen as structurally determined, at least in the core issue area s. In the end the governments institutional choices thus become rather mechanical, following more or less automatically from the circumstances in which they are made. According to LI, international institutions are ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules (Moravcsik, 1993: 508) that for instance serve to provide states with information ‘to reduce the states uncertainty about each others future preferences and behaviour (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72). Somewhat surprisingly, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig link the existence of such institutions to â€Å"unanticipated consequences† of actions, proclaiming that LI also assumes the existence of the latter: ‘If unanticipated consequences did not exist, there would be no need for international institutions to elaborate â€Å"incomplete contracts† to begin with. The reason for institutions is precisely to elaborate agreements and credibly lock in compliance against defection by future unsatisfied governments (2009: 75). This, to be sure, is a somewhat unorthodox and problematic use of the concept. When, for instance, historical institutionalists are talking about unintended or unanticipated consequences in the context of European integration, their argument is that supranational institutions and policies tend to develop in ways not originally envisaged and subsequently not approved of by member state governments (Pierson, 1996). Due to â€Å"path dependency† and other mechanisms such institutions and the course of the integration process can become impossible for governments to control. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig clearly have something altogether different in mind when they talk about unanticipated consequences. In fact, what they are talking about can more accurately be denoted ‘anticipated but undesired outcomes. These arise when rational governments anticipate that there is a risk that other rational governments will not comply with the substantive agreement that has been reached in an intergovernmental bargain. To avoid this undesired outcome governments agree on an institutional arrangement to create certainty. On this view, institutions (being ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules) only contribute to minimise uncertainty by eliminating the risk of undesired outcomes (see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72) it is unthinkable that they can develop and behave in ways not intended by governments. At the end of the day, it is not unintended consequences that LI assumes the existence of but rather the ability of governments to ver y accurately predict the consequences of their substantive agreement and on this basis chose the most suitable institutional agreements. This dubious assumption can obviously only be made if it is held, as LI does, that agents are blessed with more or less perfect information, also of future outcomes of their actions (see also Pierson, 2004: 115-XXX). 6. What choice for Europe? ‘the motivations and coalitions underlying national preferences in specific decisions reflected the economic interest of sectors as predicted by their structural position in global markets †¦ any feedback must take the form of changes in economic structures, not ideas (Moravcsik, 1999b: 382) The liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of regional integration ultimately comes down to developments in economic structures and it is therefore logical and appropriate that Moravcsik (1998: 501) refers to it as a ‘structural perspective. Although the concept of â€Å"economic structures† is not defined as clearly as other LI concepts, it basically appears to denote the phenomena that economic indicators are expressions of, examples being trade flows, inflation rates, wealth and competitiveness. The method is thus to use economic indicators as expressions of the economic structures determining the preferences of agents. For instance it reads that ‘Taken together, capital mobility, trade flows, and inflationary convergence provide a prima facie explanation of the progressive shift in national preferences away from, then back toward, exchange-rate cooperation over the two decades following the collapse of the Bretton Woods. This period saw an increase in economic openness and, beginning in the late 1970s, convergence toward low inflation (Moravcsik, 1998: 48) But what caused this and other shifts in economic circumstances? What explains the timing of such shifts? Considering the enormous importance it ascribes to economic structures it would be completely reasonable to expect LI to address and tentatively provide a theoretical answer to such questions. But it doesnt! In all fairness, Moravcsik

Analysis :: Science Writing Papers

Analysis "We scientists can no longer leave the problem to others. Indeed, it has been ours to solve, and all of society is now paying for our neglect." "Resistance to science is born of fear. Fear, in turn, is bred by ignorance. And it is ignorance that is our deepest malady." These were some of the strong statements made in Michael J. Bishop's "Enemies of Promise, " that lead me to think and analyze his piece of work. Michael Bishop, a professor of microbiology at University of California, San Francisco, begins his article by stating that even though science has solved many of the problems people have or had, there are still many who do not believe in science. In addition, there are people who study science and think that science is just "politics by other means." Thus, declaring that science and its "truths" are just "socially constructed fictions." Bishop believes that science offers more to us than we think and that it is "the best way to learn how the world works." Garcia 2 Bishop is alarmed about postmodernists, who believe science is just another "politics by other means." He thinks they are being ignorant and feels uneasy that postmodernists are being joined by other voices that are against science. Various scientists are also becoming critical of science and they believe that science is not diminishing the societies problems. Others have complained that science is "no longer contributing to health improvement." Some people are not happy with what science has accomplished. "The source of these dissatisfactions appears to be an exaggerated view of what science can do," claims Bishop. What seems to be the case is that, scientists have declared the problems of the society and have told the society what to do about some of the issues, but it is the society that is not tackling the problems. The other dilemma that faces the science is that, sometimes scientists have no control over their research and they have to let research take it's own course and time. Much of the health problems that have not been solved are being blamed on research systems like NIH (National Institutes of Health) that supposedly "demands compromise, rewards mediocrity and actually punishes initiative and originality." Bishop believes that NIH, a research system he has been in support of, is being put down and what is said about NIH, he believes it to be wrong.